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thank you and good morning. i’d like to sPeak about the right to a remedy and access to Justice in u.s. courts for victims of the “extraordinary rendition” program, 
which, as I will explain, is in effect a program established by the 
Bush administration to facilitate forced disappearances and tor-
ture and to attempt to evade accountability for these egregious 
human rights abuses. 
There is no dispute now, that the U.S. is the home of the 
“extraordinary rendition” program. This is supported by cred-
ible testimony from victims of the program, widespread media 
reporting – we’ve even got books on the evolution and opera-
tion of the program. There have been criminal investigations 
outside the United States into the operations of the CIA in 
European nations. And there have been public inquiries in 
Europe and Canada into the operation of the program. And, 
most importantly, there has been official acknowledgement by 
former President Bush and more recently President Obama of 
the existence of the detention and interrogation program run by 
the United States. 
Yet today, despite these admissions and investigations, there 
has been no criminal investigation conducted in the United 
States into the program’s operation or those persons responsible. 
Nor to date has there been any form of effective Congressional 
oversight of the program and those persons involved. In the 
absence of such criminal investigation and prosecution or effec-
tive Congressional oversight, U.S. advocates, including the 
ACLU, concerned about the program’s operation, seeking to 
bring it to an end, and to secure accountability of those involved 
(including redress for many known victims of the program) 
have resorted to civil suits in U.S. courts. From this litigation, 
it has become apparent, that although on paper, legal mecha-
nisms exist in the U.S. legal system to achieve accountability, 
advocates in practice have encountered significant obstacles in 
bringing these lawsuits. Today, I want to address in detail one 
of those impediments; the so-called “state secrets privilege” and 
touch briefly upon another of those obstacles; claims to govern-
mental immunity. 
So, just to make sure that we’re all on the same page, what 
exactly is the “extraordinary rendition” program? Based upon 
the accounts of those that have come out the other end of the 
program, there are four common elements to “extraordinary ren-
dition.” First, you have the apprehension of a person – a foreign 
national – suspected of involvement in terrorist-related activi-
ties, outside the United States. The apprehension is usually car-
ried out by the CIA; the government agency that has taken the 
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lead in devising and developing the program. The CIA does not 
work in isolation but is supported by other government depart-
ments as well as local intelligence forces in the country where 
the suspect is apprehended. All these operative events take place 
outside the United States. 
After the suspect is apprehended, they are kidnapped and 
secretly transferred to a facility, again, outside the United States, 
and which is run by the CIA – so called “black-site” deten-
tion facilities – or one run by a foreign government. The third 
component, is the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment or punishment during the suspects deten-
tion and interrogation. And this is the genesis of the “extraor-
dinary rendition” program; to facilitate forced disappearance 
and torture without accountability. As the U.S. government has 
repeatedly argued in legal pleadings: foreign nationals held out-
side the United States do not benefit from the protections of the 
[U.S.] Constitution and they have no international legal protec-
tions which are enforceable before U.S. courts. 
The fourth and final component of the program is the release 
of the individual from custody or their “warehousing” at a CIA 
“black site” facility; at the behest of a foreign government or 
alternatively, at Guantánamo. 
Separately and taken together, these practices violate a host 
of national and international laws. In the United States, there 
are a number of laws on the books which allow for criminal 
prosecution of torturers and establishing civil liability for those 
who participate in egregious human rights violations, includ-
ing forced disappearance and torture. In the criminal context, 
you have a specific act of Congress that’s called the Overseas 
Torture Act (§ 2340) which allows for the criminal prosecution 
of U.S. officials who engage in torture overseas. This act per-
mits prosecution of those officials who not only directly engage 
in torture but also those who conspire in torture. So you can see 
how this would allow for the prosecution of officials involved in 
extraordinary rendition: The U.S. has an agreement with another 
country such as, for example, Egypt, where the use of torture is 
routine, to detain and interrogate a person 
The War Crimes Act – as amended by the Military Com-
missions Act – also criminalizes certain “grave breaches” of the 
Geneva Conventions including those who torture or are com-
plicit in the practice.
U.S laws also provide for torturers to be held civilly liable. 
The first of those laws, dates back to 1789, the Alien Tort 
Claims Act. This Act allows aliens – not U.S. citizens – to sue 
for certain violations of customary international and treaty-
based law including the prohibitions on forced disappearance 
and torture. As interpreted by U.S. courts, the ATCA permits 
both individuals and corporate entities to be defendants and 
establishes liability not only for those persons who are directly 
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involved in these violations but also those that are complicit in 
them, including those who aid and abet or conspire in violations 
of international human rights law. 
The second piece of legislation, is the Torture Victim 
Protection Act. This Act allows both U.S. citizens and non-
U.S. citizens to sue for summary execution and for torture. But 
there’s a wrinkle in this piece of legislation because it only 
permits suit against defendants who commit torture under “color 
of foreign law.” The Torture Victim Protection Act allows civil 
suits against not only those directly responsible for torture but 
also those defendants who conspire to commit or aid and abet 
torture under color of foreign law.
The TVPA, for example, was used to seek civil accountabil-
ity of those U.S. officials involved in the “extraordinary rendi-
tion” of Maher Arar. Maher Arar was rendered by U.S. officials 
from the United States to Syria with the express intention that 
he be detained and interrogated under torture there. Maher’s tor-
ture, therefore, was committed by U.S. officials under color of 
Syrian law as the officials involved in the process of transferring 
him to the custody of Syria knew – and indeed intended – that 
he be subjected to torture. 
The U.S. Constitution also prohibits torture and allows for 
civil liability for those officials involved in the practice. Unlike 
the Bush administration’s view, our position is that those pro-
tections are afforded to U.S. and non-U.S. citizens alike, when-
ever and wherever they are held by U.S. officials; in other words 
there are no restrictions on the protections afforded by the U.S. 
constitution. 
Finally in 1998, Congress enacted the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act, which domestically incorporates 
U.S. obligations under Article 3 of CAT and makes it the policy 
of the United States not to send a person to a country where 
there is a substantial likelihood of torture. The Act directs gov-
ernment departments to implement regulations to give effect to 
this policy statement and both the Department of Justice and 
Department of State have done so. 
There are a number of international laws binding on the 
United States which prohibit extraordinary rendition: the ICCPR 
and the Convention against Torture, being the most obvious 
ones. However, the U.S. entered a certain reservation to these 
treaties – they are so-called “non-self executing” provisions, 
which impose restrictions on an individual’s right to directly 
enforce these treaty protections in U.S. courts. That being said, 
these provisions also form a part of customary international law, 
which forms part of the law of the United States and is binding 
on it.
 These civil laws have formed the basis of three civil suits 
filed in U.S. courts seeking to challenge the operation of the 
extraordinary rendition program and to hold accountable those 
individuals – as well as the corporate entities – responsible. To 
begin on a positive note, U.S. advocates have not been alto-
gether unsuccessful in using U.S courts to challenge some of 
the worst counter-terrorism policies and practices employed by 
the Bush administration. Many of you’ll be aware that in a series 
of cases, the Supreme Court struck down the former execu-
tive’s effort to detain foreign nationals at Guantánamo indefi-
nitely without review and to try Guantánamo prisoners before 
Bush-created military commissions. But these cases, as you’ll 
note, all concern U.S. detention policies. To date, however, 
lower courts in the United States – without exception – have 
repeatedly declined to recognize that victims of U.S. rendition, 
detention, and torture policies have a right to civil redress in 
U.S. courts for their injuries. These courts have done so in one 
of two ways: they’ve either dismissed those claims from the 
very outset, without consideration of the merits of the victims’ 
claims, on the basis of the so-called “state secrets privilege.” 
Or, they’ve upheld government claims to official immunity for 
their actions without consideration of evidence verifying the 
nature and extent of the torture victims’ claims, including offi-
cial documents from the United States government proving that 
techniques were employed that constitute torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment and that these techniques were 
employed as a matter of policy. 
U.S. courts have held that even if the U.S. does indeed forc-
ibly disappear persons or torture them as a matter of policy, 
victims of these policies have no remedy in the courts of the 
United States.
Let me illustrate how this has worked in practice by refer-
ence to two cases in which I’ve been involved on behalf of 
seven victims of the extraordinary rendition program: El-Masri 
vs. Tenet and Mohammed v. Jeppesen. In the time remaining, I’ll 
touch on the immunity issues. 
Turning to the factual background of the El-Masri case. 
At the end of 2003, as Khalid El-Masri, a German citizen of 
Lebanese decent, was crossing the border between Serbia and 
Macedonia, he was apprehended by officials at the border 
and thereafter detained for twenty-three days by agents of the 
Macedonian intelligence. While detained, he was interrogated 
about his alleged associations with Islamic fundamentalist 
groups in his home country, Germany. After twenty-three days 
of such questioning, El-Masri is handed over to a CIA “black 
rendition team”; he’s stripped, he’s beaten, he’s drugged, and 
he’s chained spread-eagled to the floor of a plane before being 
flown to Afghanistan and held in a secret over-seas prison run 
by the CIA. There, he is held for over five months. Shortly after 
his transfer to Afghanistan media reports suggest that senior 
officials within the United States government were made aware 
that they were holding an innocent man in a secret over-seas 
prison. Orders were given for his release but he languishes under 
horrendous conditions until his release months later. Rather than 
being released back to his home in Germany El Masri is flown 
to Albania and unceremoniously dumped on a hilltop in the dead 
of night to make his own way home to Germany. Following his 
return, much, if not all of his story, has subsequently been cor-
roborated by independent evidence, including testimony from 
U.S. officials, and evidence uncovered in a German criminal 
investigation and Parliamentary inquiry into his case. 
In December of 2005, we, the ACLU, filed a civil case on 
Khalid El-Masri’s behalf. We filed suit under the Constitution 
and under the Alien Tort Claims Act. We named George Tenet, 
head of the CIA at the time Khalid El-Masri was rendered as 
a defendant and three U.S.-based aviation corporations, which 
facilitated the rendition. Flight records we obtained showed that 
these aviation corporations either owned or operated the aircraft 
used by the CIA in El-Masri’s rendition. We also alleged that 
these corporations knew or reasonably should have been aware 
that they were complicit in El-Masri’s torture. Shortly after fil-
ing suit, the United States government sought to intervene in 
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the litigation to invoke the state secrets privilege and to have 
the case immediately dismissed with no consideration of the 
evidence. 
Very briefly, the states secrets privilege is a common law 
evidentiary privilege. It has no Constitutional basis. Properly 
invoked, it can be used by the government to exclude discrete 
pieces of evidence in any case where consideration of that 
evidence in court would be harmful to the country’s national 
security. When we talk about national security in this context, 
we refer to means and methods of interrogation gathering and 
U.S. relations with other foreign powers. 
The privilege has been recognized by the Supreme Court 
since 1954 and the Supreme Court in turn developed it from 
an analogous common law evidentiary privilege recognized 
under the English common law, Crown Privilege. In support of 
its position that litigation of El Masri’s case would be harmful 
to national security, the government produced two affidavits; 
that was the extent of the “evidence” they produced for the 
court substantiating dismissal from the very outset. Both were 
produced by the former director of the CIA, Porter Goss; one 
was made public and the other for the judge’s eyes only so we 
weren’t privy to that one and have no idea what case the gov-
ernment made for outright dismissal of the litigation. 
Following the court’s consideration of the government’s 
affidavits and extensive submissions that we made; and a brief 
oral argument, the court upheld the government’s state secrets 
claim, finding that the very subject matter of the litigation – the 
United States’ operation of a rendition, detention and interro-
gation program was a state secret and that there were no pro-
cedures available to U.S. courts that would adequately protect 
its national security interests, while at the same time allowing 
Khalid El-Masri his day in court. As an alternative to dismissal, 
we had argued that the court had mechanisms at its disposal that 
could accommodate those competing interests. For example, 
we suggested that there be closed hearings; not the best but its 
better than throwing it out of court from the very beginning. 
We also suggested appointment of a Special Master or entering 
Protective Orders – all mechanisms that U.S. courts routinely 
employ and in fact have employed in post-9/11 litigation, 
including Guantánamo habeas litigation where national security 
issues arise all the time. 
The court, however, found none of these alternatives to 
dismissal appropriate and effectively ignored all the publicly 
available and very reliable information substantiating most of 
Khalid’s testimony, and admissions from the Bush administra-
tion that it did indeed operate a rendition, detention and inter-
rogation program. The court upheld the government’s claim to 
national security and dismissed the case from the very outset. 
The decision from the lower court was upheld by the court 
of appeals on arguably broader grounds. The court of appeals 
found that there was a constitutional basis for the government’s 
assertion of the state secrets privilege; it wasn’t just evidentiary 
in nature. The end of the road domestically for Khalid came 
in October 2007 when the Supreme Court, without comment, 
declined to even review the court of appeals’ decision. 
From the El Masri case and another challenge to the 
“extraordinary rendition” program that we filed in October 2007 
on the behalf of five other victims of the extraordinary rendi-
tion program, Mohamed v. Jeppesen, it’s clear that U.S. courts 
are prepared to accept, carte blanche, government assertions of 
national security, even where the allegations against the govern-
ment are its involvement in egregious human rights violations 
such as forced disappearance and torture, and even when those 
allegations are corroborated by reliable, official, and publicly 
available sources. 
In Jeppesen, we sued Jeppesen DataPlan, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the Boeing aerospace company. Jane Mayer – who 
is here today – initially identified Jeppesen’s involvement in the 
“extraordinary rendition” program, by reporting a conversation 
she had with an unnamed former employee of Jeppesen, who 
had been in company meetings where senior officials openly 
discussed the corporations involvement in the CIA “torture 
flights.” Based on this and other evidence linking Jeppesen to 
the rendition of our five clients, we sued the company for know-
ingly assisting the CIA in the forcible disappearance and torture 
of our five clients. Specifically, our publicly available evidence 
showed that Jeppesen provided crucial flight and logistical sup-
port services to aircraft used by the CIA in the rendition of the 
five men. 
All of the men are non-U.S. citizens and all were rendered 
to detention and interrogation in CIA “black-site” detention 
facilities or by foreign governments. Jeppesen is the only named 
defendant in the case, which is brought under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act. Just as in the El-Masri case, even before discovery, 
the United States sought to intervene in the litigation to seek 
dismissal of the case from the very outset. The lower court, 
simply accepted the government’s assertion of harm to national 
security interests, ignored publicly available evidence pointing 
to Jeppesen’s involvement and dismissed the case. We appealed 
the case to the Ninth Circuit and were hopeful that the newly 
installed Obama administration would adopt a more reason-
able approach in the litigation with regard to assertion of the 
privilege. 
Obama immediately on taking office promised greater 
transparency and openness in government. However, during the 
hearing on the appeal, government lawyers expressly adopted 
the same position on state secrets as the Bush administration, 
to seek immediate dismissal of the case. The judges seemed 
slightly incredulous, by the stance of the government and from 
their pointed questioning of the government suggested they may 
be open to the possibility of a remand to the lower court to have 
the state secrets privilege invoked as it should be, not to have 
a litigation dismissed from the outset, but rather in a more dis-
crete way over any evidence that may compromise U.S. national 
security interests. 
What is apparent from these two cases is that the Bush 
administration and now the Obama administration is using the 
state secrets privilege not as it was initially crafted, as a shield to 
protect sensitive national security interests, but rather as a sword 
to cover up mistakes, embarrassment, and worse still, egregious 
human rights violations. And, U.S. courts, by simply accept-
ing these claims without further searching inquiry, are turning 
a blind eye to publicly available evidence and facilitating a 
government cover-up. The whole world now knows the funda-
mental facts of these cases, yet the victims of the “extraordinary 
rendition” program have been denied their day in a U.S. court 
to have their claims adjudicated. What the state secrets privilege 
has morphed into is a form of governmental immunity. HRB
